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In The Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,

vs.

Case No.
11766

ROBERT JOSEPH SMELSER,
Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
The appellant was convicted by a jury of the crime
of grand larceny in the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, in and for Utah County, State of Utah, the
Honorable Allen B. Sorensen, Judge, presiding.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The matter was tried May 12, 1969. The case was
submitted w the jury, which returned a verdict of guilty
of the crime of grand larceny. The Court denied appellant's motion for a new trial and sentenced the defendant
to the Utah State Prison for an indeterminate term as
provided by law.
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REL1EF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The respondent prays that this court will affirm the
trial court below.

STA TEMENT OF FACTS
The respondent accepts the facts as stated in appellant's brief as being fairly representative of the situation
and circumstances surrounding this case.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN REFUSING TO ALLOW CROSS-EXAMINATION OF MAX
WEENIG THAT WAS BY ITS NATURE ARGUMENTATIVE.
The appellant contends reversible error, alleging
that the trial court denied him the right to cross-examine
Mr. Max Weenig, a witness for the prosecution, as to his
motives for testifying as he did on direct examination.
The respondent admits that cross-examination of a
witness is a matter of right, Alford v. United States, 282
U.S. 687, 691 (1931); that such examination may be
designed to expose the motives of the witness for testifying as he did on direct examination, Utah Code Ann. §
7 8-24-1 ( 19 53) ; and that such exposure properly goes
to the credibility of the witness's direct testimony.
However, cross-examination must comport with
proper judicial standards. The trial court is vested with

wide discretion in controlling the scope and manner of
cross-examination, and in order to find error the reviewing court must find an abuse of that discretion, State v.
Bustamante, 103 Ariz. 5 51, 447 P.2d 243 ( 1968); State
v. Jackson, 201 Kan. 795, 443 P.2d 279 (1968); State v.
Kinder, 14 Utah 2d 199, 381 P.2d 82 (1963). Moreover,
a trial court that disallows argumentative questions on
cross-examination has not abused that discretion, State
v. Eichman, 69 Wash. 2d 327, 418 P.2d 418 (1966).
The dialogue the appellant is challenging is on page
22 of the \Veenig transcript and is quoted as follows:

Q.

Now you say you saw the Deputy
Sheriff, Mack Holley, and said you
thought you could pump information
out of Smelser on this burglary, right?

D.

Yes, Sir.

Q.

Have you been in the habit of reporting to the authorities on what prisoners
tell you?

MR. GAMMON:

Objection.

THE COURT:

Sustained.

Q.

(by Mr. King) You
had a reason for doing
-for talking to Mack
Holley, didn't you?

MR. GAMMON:

Objection.

THE COURT:

Sustained.
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Q.

(by Mr. King) Did
you hope to gain something by telling the
authorities.

MR. GAMMON:

Objection.

THE COURT:

Sustained. You are
arguing to the 1ury
now, Mr. King. This
isn't the time yet for
that. There will be a
time for that, but not
now, with this witness.

It is clear from the foregoing dialogue that the questions
asked the appellant on cross-examination were argumentative in nature. Thus, the trial court properly acted
within its discretion in sustaining the State's objections
against them.
The transcript shows that the trial court made every
effort, within sound judicial discretion, to allow defense
counsel the scope of cross-examination he required. On
Page 4 of said transcript we read:
THE COURT: I don't mean to cut you
off on questioning about promises or
threats, but further inquiry into his
criminal record, I will cut you off. I
think that is the law of this State.
MR. KING: Yes, your Honor, I intend to
comply with that. I would like to in-
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quire _into his mental attitude, if he hopes
to gam.
Later on page 16, the following dialogue occurred:
MR. GAMMON: W'e would object your
Honor. This line of questioning has no
relevancy to the matter before the
Court.
THE COURT: What do you claim for
this Mr. King? \Vhat bearing does this
have on the matter before the Court?
MR. KING:
Mr. Weenig
iarity with
information

I think, your Honor, that
has his own personal familthis premises and this isn't
he gained from Mr. Smelser.

THE COURT:
swer remam.

Well, I will let that an-

Later on page 18 of the transcript the trial court allowed
repetitive questions and answers on cross-examination.
Then on page 19, in response to a State's objection, the
court said:
THE COURT: I am reluctant to cut
anybody off on cross-examination, so I
will let him answer the question.
However, on several occasions during the cross-examination the Court sustained the State's objections on the
grounds that counsel's questions were argumentative
(Weenig T. p. 18, 20, 21. 22).
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It is clear from the general tenor of the entire crossexamination that the judge was reluctant to inhibit counsel in his cross-examination. However, where the nature
of questions were argumentative, the trial judge acted
properly, and within his discretion, when he sustained the
State's objections.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN GIVING
jURY INSTRUCTION NUMBER SEVEN.
The pertinent part of instruction number seven is
quoted in appellant's brief pages 11 & 12. The appellant
challenges the instruction on two grounds: ( 1) that it is
an unlawful comment on the evidence by the Court, and
(2) that it breaches the appellant's constitutional right
against self-incrimination.
A. JURY INSTRUCTION NUMBER SEVEN
WAS NOT AN UNLAWFUL COMMENT ON THE
EVIDENCE
Utah Code Ann. § 7 6-3 8-1 ( 19 5 3) defines larceny
as f ol'lows:
"Larceny is the felonious stealing, taking, carrying, leading or driving away the
personal property of another. Possession of
poperty recently stolen, when the person
in possession fails to make a satisfactory explanation, shall be deemed prima facie evidence of guilt."
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The appellant challenges the instruction on grounds
of it being an unlawful comment by alleging that it instructs the jury on the prima facie case of larceny. He further argues that the foregoing statute defining larceny
is a standard by which the Court may determine whether
or not the case should go to the jury, and therefore, should
not be incorporated as part of a jury instruction. He cites
State v. Crowder, 114 Utah 202, 197 P.2d 917 (1948)
as authority for his argument.
The challenged instruction in Crcnvder is as follows:

". . . If you find from the evidence,

beyond a reasonable doubt ( 1) that some
one had committed larceny; (2) that defendant was found in possession of recently
stolen property; ( 3) that the defendant
failed to give a satisfactory explanation,
then there is an inference that the defendant
committed larceny, and that inference beyond that of other evidence be considered
in determining whether you are convinced
beyond a reasonable doubt of defendant's
guilt." 114 Utah at 209. (Emphasis added.)
This Court found the foregoing instruction faulty on
two grounds. FIRST, the instruction tells the jury what
constitutes a prima facie case, and SECOND, because
the instruction invited the jury to give special attention
to the "unexphined possession" evidence. Id at 209 and 210.
These frailties
instruction is clear
traband is merely
prima facie case

are not present in the instant case. The
that "unexplained possession" of conprima facie evidence of guilt, not a
of guilt. This distinction has been
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sustained by this Court in State v. Potel!o, 40 Utah 56,
119 P. 1023 (1911 ).
Moreover, the instruction does not set out the "unexplained possession" evidence as having greater probity
than other evidence, as was the case in the Crowder instruction. Rather, the instruction emphasizes that the
"unexplained possession" testimony merely tends to show
guilt and should thus be considered by the jury along
with all other facts and circumstances of the case. This
comports with the construction of the Utah Statute,
supra, by this Court. State v. Wood, 2 Utah 2d 34, 268
P.2d998 (1954).
This Court, in State v. Little, 5 Utah 2d 42, 296 P.2d
289
held an instruction valid which is almost
identical to in the instruction now being challenged by
the appellant. In so doing, this Court said:
"The first paragraph follows the statute, U.C.A. 1953 § 76-38-1, and the decided cases, Staff v. Crowder (citations
omitted); State v. Hall (citations omitted)." 5 Utah 2d at 44.
In view of the case law in this State, it is clear that
instruction seven was not an unlawful comment on the
evidence by the trial court.
B. JURY INSTRUCTION NUMBER SEVEN
DID NOT VIOLATE APPELLANT'S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION.
The appellant urges that the instruction given m
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the instant case is the equivalent of an instruction that
the jury may draw inferences as to the guilt of the accused from his silence. While it is true that comment directly on the defendant's failure to testify is not permissible, such comment is not the equivalent of the instruction in the present case.
The United States Supreme Court has sustained
such a distinction in United States v. Gainey, 3 80 U.S.
63 (1965). In this case the Court rejected defendant's
argument that an instruction, similar to the one in the
instant case, was deemed to be a comment on the defendant's failure to testify:
"Furthermore, in the content of the
instruction as a whole, we do not consider
that the single phrase, unless the defendant
by the evidence in the case and by proven
facts and circumstances explains such presence to the satisfaction of the jury, can be
fairly understood as a comment on the petitioner's failure to testify." 380 U.S. at 70
and 71.

United States v. Secondino, 347 F.2d 725 (2nd Cir.
1965), cert den., 382 U.S. 931 (1965), reh. den., 382
U.S. 1002 (1966), relied on the Gainey case and specifically held that an instruction similar to the one in the instant case is not a violation of one's constitutional right
against self-incrimination.
In the Secondino case the defendant had appealed his
conviction on a narcotics charge. The trial court had
read the actual provisions of the narcotics statute to the
jury, which allowed them (the jury) to draw an inference
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of guilt from evidence of "unexplained possession." The
instruction challenged was:
"Whenever on trial for violation of
this section the defendant is shown to have
or to have had possession of the narcotic
drug, such possession shall be deemed sufficient evidence to authorize conviction
unless the defendant explains the possession
to the satisfaction of the jury." (Emphasis
added.) 347 F.2d at 727.
The appellate Court then pointed out that the trial
court:
" . . . followed this with the wholly
adequate instruction that a finding of possesion, not explained permits you to draw
the inference and find ... that the defendant had knowledge that the narcotic drug
was imported contrary to law." (Emphasis
added.) 347 F.2d at 727.
Whereupon the Court rejected appellant's argument that
the challenged instruction violated his constitutional
right against self-incrimination. 347 F.2d 725, 727. See
also Brown v. United Stales, 370 F.2d 874 ( 1967).
This Court has repeatedly held Utah Code Ann.

§ 76-38-1 (1953) constitutional, as well as jury instructions pursuant thereto. State v. Martinez, 21 Utah 2d 187,

442 P.2d 943 ( 1968). The Tenth Circuit has concurred
with this holding. State v. Martinez, No. 110-68, July
1969 Term (10th Cir. July 15, 1969).
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It is clear from the foregoing that appellant's contention that instruction seven denies him of his constitutional right against self-incrimination is without merit.
POINT III
THE AFFIDAVIT UPON WHICH THE SEARCH
WARRANT WAS ISSUED CLEARLY STA TED
FACTS SUFFICIENT TO SHOW PROBABLE CAUSE.
Utah Code Ann. § 77 - 54- 3 ( 19 53 ) establishes the
grounds for the issuance of a search warrant:
"A search warrant shall not issue except upon pobable cause supported by oath
or affirmation, particularly describing the
place to be searched and the person or
thing to be seized." (Emphasis added.)
The appellant challenges the search warrant in the
instant case, alleging that the affidavit in support thereof
is not of sufficient particularity to establish probable
cause.
The United States Supreme Court in Jones v. United
States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960), held that an affidavit must
state facts upon which the belief of the affidavit is based
in order to establish probable cause, 362 U.S. 257, 269;
that the affiant's information may be based on hearsay
information if such information is reasonably corroborated by other matters within the affiant's own knowledge,
262 U.S. 257, 269; and that the name of the infomant
need not be given, 262 U.S. 257, 271. See also Rugendorf
v. United States. 376 U.S. 5 8 (1964) and United States v.
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Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102 (1965). Utah law is in accord
with this standard, Allen v. Lindbeck, 97 Utah 471, 93
P.2d 920 (1939).

In the instant case, it is clear that the chatlenged affidavit states facts sufficient to establish probable cause.
Page one (1) of the affidavit (R. 32A) sets forth the
affiant's belief that there is probable cause to suspect that
the appellant had possession of certain personal property.
The place of possession is described with particularity.
The personal property, although not described on page
one ( 1), nor identified as stolen, is described with particularity on a list attached to the affidavit (R. 3 2 A, sheets
4 and 5). Moreover, the attached sheet is identified as
"Gene Evans Pharmacy, 266 North University Ave.,
Provo, Utah, Burglary loss.... " (R. 32A, sheet 4).
The appellant challenges the validity of the affidavit
by alleging that the personal property believed to be in
appellant's possession is not identified as the stolen property. This argument is without merit when the affidavit
is read as a whole. As was mentioned above, the attached
list identified the property both as to description and as
to it being the stolen property. It is not necessary that
this idenification be on the front page. A dear reference
to an attached list of property would seem to be a perfectly acceptable procedure. In the words of the appellant, "It is conceded at the outset that the affidavit need
not be finely technical ... " (Appellant's brief, P. 15). It
seems appellant's objection on this point is based more on
technicality than on substance.
Page 2 of the affidavit (R. 32A, sheet 2) also identifies the property as being stolen. In addition, page 2 sets
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forth facts which support the affiant's belief, thus giving
rise to probable cause. FIRST, the affiant is a deputy
sheriff of 19 years experience. SECOND, 15 of those 19
years have been spent in the detective division. THIRD,
the affiant received his information from Dave Reynolds,
Department of Business Regulations, who in turn had received the information from a confidential informant.
FOURTH, said Dave Reynolds had made a buy from the
appellant, through his informant, and had identified the
item purchased as property stolen from the Provo drug
store.
There are several facts in the above four points that
give rise to probable cause. The af fiant was an experienced
officer of the law. His source of information, Dave
Reynolds, was also involved in law enforcement; i.e., business regulation. Although the item purchased through
Reynolds' informant was not specifically described in the
affidavit, it was sworn that Reynolds had in fact made
such an identification.
The appellant challenges the affidavit because of this
specific lack of identification. He asks: " ... what proof
is there that it was stolen other than his conclusion (affiant's conclusion)?" (appellant's brief pg. 18). However,
the appellant goes too far in supposing that the affidavit
must show facts that prove the case. The United States
Supreme Court in Jones v. United States, supra, said:
"We reject the contention that an officer may act without a warrant only when
his basis for acting would be competent
evidence upon a trial to prove defendant's
guilt ... such a contention goes much too
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far in confusing and disregarding the difference between what is required to prove
guilt in a criminal case and what is required to show probable cause for arrest or
search . . . There is a large difference between the two things to be proved (guilt
and probable cause) ... and therefore a like
difference in the quanta and modes of proof
required to establish them." 262 U.S. at 270
The United States Supreme Court affirmed this distinction in United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102 (1965),
when it said:
" ... this Court has long held that the
term probable cause ... means less than evidence which would justify condemnation .... " 380 U.S. at 107
In light of this standard, it seems clear and convincing that the affiant's belief was well established by
facts in the affidavit, thus giving rise to probable cause.
Therefore, the affidavit clearly comports with constitutional standards as a condition precedent to a search warrant and as a consequence, this Court should sustain the
validity of the search warrant in the instant case.
POINT IV
THE AFFIDAVIT SUPPORTING THE SEARCH
WARRANT \'7AS NOT IMPEACHED DURING THE
TRIAL AND THUS THE COURT ACTED PROPERLY IN ADMITTING EVIDENCE OBTAINED PURSUANT TO SAID SEARCH WARRANT.
The appellant alleges that Officer Hayward's affidavit was impeached on cross-examination and thus the
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evidence obtained pursuant to the search warrant was
erroneously admitted by the Court. Appellant argues the
impeachment because ( 1) Officer Hayward did not know
whether the informant had made the buy of stolen property pursuant to the request of Officer Reynolds, and
( 2) because Officer Hayward had not seen the property
purchased nor could he identify the same (T. p. 7). The
appellant further alleges that such admissions are not consistent with the affidavit, thus showing the affidavit to
be untrue and hence insufficient to support the search
warrant.
In light of the above allegations, it is necessary to
carefully examine the wording of the affidavit. Officer
Hayward said in the affidavit that "Dave Reynolds, Dept.
of Business Regulations, through a confidential informant
did make a buy from Smelser. . . . " (R. 32A, sheet 2).
Officer Hayward did not say that the buy was pursuant
to Officer Reynolds' request. As a matter of fact, he did
not specify. Therefore, for Officer Hayward to testify
that he did not know under what arrangements the buy
was made was not inconsistent with his statement in the
affidavit. In fact, the two statements are clearly consistent. A buy was made, and it was through an informant.
In addition, Officer Hayward's statement on crossexamination that he could not identify the property
bought, nor had he seen it, is totally consistent with his
affidavit. Quoting further from the affidavit, Officer
Hayward said, " ... Dave Reynolds ... through the conidential informant did make a buy from Smelser and has
identified the same as coming from a burglary of Gene
Evans Pharmacy at Provo, Utah." (Emphasis added.)
(R. 32A, sheet 2).
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The appellant challenges the veracity of the affidavit
because Officer Hayward had to rely on the acts and
words of Officer Reynolds. However, the United States
Supreme Court has allowed such reliance to give rise to
probable cause as a condition precedent to a search warrant. In United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102 (1965),
an affidavit reading as follows was upheld as establishing
probable cause:
"Based upon observations made by me,
and based upon information received officially from other investigators attached to
the Alcohol and Tobacco Division assigned
to this investigation, and reports orally
made to me describing the result of their
observations and investigations, this request
for the issuance of a search warrant is
made." 380 U.S. at 103 and 104.
The Court upheld the affidavit by saying:
"Recital of some of the underlying circumstances in the affidavit is essential if the
magistrate is to perform his detached function and not serve merely as a rubber stamp
for the police. However, where these circumstances are detailed, where reason for

crediting the source of the information is
given, and when a magistrate has found
probable cause, the courts should not in-

validate the warrant by interpreting the affidavit in a hypertechnical, rather than a
common sense manner." (Emphasis added.)
380 U.S. a 109.
See also Spinelli v. United States, .... U.S ..... , 89 S. Ct.
584 (1969).
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In view of the foregoing, we submit that the information in the affidavit is consistent with Officer Hayward's testimony on cross-examination; that his reliance
on Officer Reynold's information was justified and credible; that it would be hypertechnical for this Court to
overturn the search warrant when in fact a magistrate
at the trial level properly found probable cause. Thus, it
was proper for the trial court to admit evidence that was
obtained pusuant to the search warrant.
CONCLUSION
The respondent submits that the appellant was not
denied his right of cross-examination in any way and that
sustained obiections were proper because of the argumentative nature of appellant's questions on cross-examination.
Further, the respondent contends that jury instruction seven was not prejudicial error; rather, it was consistent with Utah statutory and case law.
And finally, it is the respondent's position that the
affidavit supporting the search warrant did give rise to
probable cause and thus comports with State and Federal constitutional standards. Moreover, Officer Hayward's answers on cross-examination in no way impeached
the validity of the affidavit or the search warrant pursuant thereto.
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Therefore, the
respectfully prays that
this Court will affirm the appellant's conviction.
Respectively submitted,

VERNON B. ROMNEY
Attorney General
State of Utah

LAUREN N. BEASLEY
Chief Assistant Attorney
General'

DAVID S. YOUNG
Assistant Attorney General
236 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
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